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B
ank mergers have attracted much attention
during the last year due to a surge in
mergers among the nations largest bank-
ing  companies. The consolidation of the bank-
ing industry has been going on much longer,
however. Since the early 1980s, the number of
banking organizations has fallen by more than a
third in both Tenth District states and the nation
as a whole. Some of the decline has been due to
failures, but most has been due to mergers.
In debating the pros and cons of such consoli-
dation, analysts point to three important ways it
may alter the structure of the banking industry.
First, if consolidation occurs through the absorp-
tion of small banks by large banks, it may reduce
the role of small banks in the banking system.
Second, if consolidation occurs through the merger
of banking organizations in different markets, it
may increase the geographic scope of bank
operationsthat is, the extent to which banks
operate over wide areas within and across state
lines. And third, if consolidation occurs through
the merger of banking organizations within the
same market, it may increase the concentration
of local marketsthat is, the tendency for markets
to be dominated by a few banks. Analysts agree
each of these effects is important to bank owners
and customers but disagree as to whether each
effect is beneficial or harmful on balance. 
Has consolidation had these effects, and if so,
to what degree? To date, no one has carefully
examined this question for Tenth District states.
This article attempts to fill the gap by document-
ing the effects of bank mergers on the role of
small banks, the geographic scope of bank opera-
tions, and the concentration of local banking
markets in Tenth District states. The article con-
cludes that consolidation has reduced the role of
small banks, increased geographic diversity, and
increased local market concentration. The mag-
nitude of these effects, though, has differed across
states and between urban and rural markets within
each state. The first section provides an overview
of how consolidation has reduced the number of
banking organizations. The next three sections
quantify the effects of consolidation on size
distribution, geographic scope, and concentration.
AN OVERVIEW OF DISTRICT
BANKING CONSOLIDATION
The number of banking organizations has
declined sharply in Tenth District states.  This
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most of it has been due, not to bank failures, but
to a steadily increasing rate of bank mergers.
1
The decline in banking organizations
As evidence of banking consolidation, finan-
cial commentators often point to the decline in
the number of banking organizations.
2 A bank-
ing organization is defined as a multibank hold-
ing company, a one-bank holding company, or
an independent bank. Table 1 shows that a sharp
break in the growth of district banking organiza-
tions took place in the mid-1980s. During the
first half of the 1980s, the number of banking
organizations in Tenth District states held steady
at about 2,400.  But the number of organizations
fell sharply in the second half of the decade and
dropped to about 1,500 by 1995. Over the 1979-
95 period, the number of organizations fell by 37
percent. This decline coincided with a moderate
increase in district population, producing a
sharp drop in the number of banking organiza-
tions per capita.
3
The total attrition in banking organizations
was about the same in the nation as the district.
Over the same 1979-95 period, the number of
banking organizations in the nation fell 39
percent, only slightly more than in the district.
In contrast to the district, however, the number
of banking organizations in the United States fell
in all three subperiods, including the first half of
the 1980s. 
All district states shared in the decline in bank-
ing organizations. As indicated in Table 2,  the
two states that enjoyed the highest population
growth over the period also lost the fewest bank-
ing organizationsColorado and New Mexico,
both with declines of less than one-fifth.
4  Declines
were much greater in the other five states, exceed-
ing a third in each state.
Sources of the decline in banking organizations
 The number of banking organizations is influ-
enced by other factors besides mergers. Some of
the decline in banking organizations could be
due to a high rate of failures or a low rate of
formation of new organizations. To determine
the relative importance of these various factors,
Table 3 decomposes the change in district bank-
ing organizations from the end of 1979 to the
end of 1995 into four sourcesvoluntary mergers
and breakups, failures, new bank charters, and
Table 1
NUMBER OF BANKING ORGANIZATIONS
End of year
1979 1984 1989 1995
Percent change,
    1979-95   
Tenth District states 2,400 2,401 1,997 1,521 -37 
United States 12,490 11,410 9,608 7,672 -39 
Note: Organizations are defined at the district level for Tenth District states and at the national level for the United States.
Source: National Information Center Database.
30 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYnet conversions of nonbanks to banks. The last
column shows the results for the entire period,
while the first four columns report the results for
three  subperiods1980-84, 1985-89,  and 1990-
95. The same decomposition is reported for each
district state in Table A1 of the appendix. 
Table 3 highlights three important facts about
district banking consolidation. First, over the
period as a whole, mergers actually accounted for
all of the decline in banking organizations, with
the positive effect of new charters and conver-
sions approximately offsetting the negative effect
of failures. Specifically, voluntary mergers and
breakups resulted in a net loss of 907 organiza-
tions over the 16-year period, slightly more than
the actual decline in organizations.  
Second, while the steep decline in organiza-
tions in the district did not begin in earnest until
1985, a substantial number of organizations were
lost through mergers even before that point. A
total of 182 organizations were lost through
mergers in the years 1980-84. The only reason the
number of organizations remained approxi-
mately unchanged during those years was that
there were sufficient new charters to offset the
negative effect of mergers.
Third, while sizable throughout the period, the
loss of organizations through voluntary mergers
increased over time, reaching an especially high
level in the 1990s. The net loss of organizations
from mergers and breakups increased to 257 in
1985-89  (an average of 51 per year) and then
jumped to 468 in 1990-95 (an average of 78 per
year). The only reason the number of organiza-
tions did not fall significantly more in 1990-95
was a sharp slowdown in failures. In the 1990s,
only 42 banking organizations were lost from
this source, far fewer than the 225 failures during
the second half of the 1980s.
The upward trend in district mergers is also
evident in Chart 1, which plots the number and
inflation-adjusted assets of organizations acquired
each year through voluntary mergers.
5 The chart
shows that acquisitions increased over the period
but varied somewhat from year to year, peaking
in 1984, 1988, and 1993. Acquisitions jumped
Table 2
NUMBER OF BANKING ORGANIZATIONS BY STATE
End of year
1979 1984 1989 1995
Percent change,
    1979-95   
Colorado 213 257 240 173 -19
Kansas 614 627 515 385 -37
Missouri 508 434 384 323 -36
Nebraska 449 446 351 279 -38
New Mexico 63 63 59 53 -16
Oklahoma 488 513 402 307 -37
Wyoming 67 65 53 43 -36
Source: National Information Center Database.
ECONOMIC REVIEW · SECOND QUARTER 1996 31an especially large amount in 1993, remained
high in 1994, and then subsided somewhat in
1995. The amount of assets acquired through
voluntary mergers peaked in the same years but
showed much more variation, dominated as it
was by the handful of megamergers between very
large organizations.
6
What accounted for the general increase in dis-
trict merger activity over the period? Some of the
increase was due to the same factors at work in the
nation as a whole, while some of the increase was
due to factors specific to the district. During the
1980s, a desire to reduce risk through geographic
diversification accounted for many acquisitions.
And in the 1990s, many mergers were motivated
by a desire to cut costs by eliminating overlap in
branches and back-office facilities. Relaxation of
legal barriers to consolidation also played an
especially important role in the district. At the
beginning of the period, no district state allowed
banks to operate branches throughout the state,
and no district state allowed acquisitions by out-of-
state holding companies. Moreover, three states
prohibited bank holding companies from acquir-
ing additional banks within the stateKansas,
Nebraska, and Oklahoma. By the end of the
period, these barriers had been drastically re-
duced, with all seven states allowing multibank
holding company expansion, some form of state-




THE SIZE OF BANKING
ORGANIZATIONS
It is widely believed that an important conse-
quence of banking consolidation is a reduced
role for small banks in the banking system.  Some
analysts welcome this change, arguing that small
banking organizations are less efficient at back-
room operations than large organizations, less
able to offer a wide array of financial services to
their customers, and less able to lend because of
their lack of access to the capital markets. Other
analysts decry the change, arguing that small
banking organizations are more able and willing
than large organizations to lend to small busi-
nesses. Moreover, small banking organizations
are less likely to impose huge costs on the gov-
ernment should they fail.
8 
Table 3
SOURCES OF CHANGE IN NUMBER OF BANKING ORGANIZATIONS
Tenth District states
1980-84 1985-89 1990-95 Entire period
Mergers and breakups -182 -257 -468 -907
Failures -21 -225 -42 -288
New charters 182 56 26 264
Conversions 21 20 8 49
Net change 0 -406 -476 -882
Note: Failures exclude failed organizations succeeded by new organizations, while new charters exclude new organiza-
tions that succeed failed organizations. Conversions represent the net effect of banks becoming insured, thrifts convert-
ing to banks, and banks converting to thrifts.
Source: National Information Center Database.
32 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYThis section confirms that consolidation has
significantly reduced the role of small banking
organizations in Tenth District states. Such
organizations, however, remain much more
important in the district than in the nation, and
urban bank customers have been less affected
than rural customers. Thus, the recent interest in
the costs and benefits of a decline in the role of
small banks appears fully warranted.
Change in the size distribution of assets
The role of small banking organizations can be
measured by their share of total banking assets.
Table 4 shows the distribution of assets among
three size categories of banking organizations
small organizations, with less than $100 million
in assets in constant 1995 dollars; medium-size
organizations, with $100 million to $1 billion in
assets; and large organizations, with more than
$1 billion in assets. For the district as a whole,
the share of small organizations fell from just
under a third of total assets at the end of 1979 to
a fifth at the end of 1995a drop of 11 percentage
points. The gain accrued entirely to large organi-
zations, as the share of medium-size organiza-
tions slipped a couple of percentage points.
9
The distribution of banking assets also shifted
from small organizations toward large organiza-
20






Source: Reports of Income and Condition and National Information Center Database.
ACQUISITIONS OF BANKING ORGANIZATIONS
Tenth District states
Chart 1

















ECONOMIC REVIEW · SECOND QUARTER 1996 33tions in the nation as a whole, but to a lesser
degree. The share of small organizations fell only
five percentage points and the share of large
organizations increased only eight points, reduc-
ing somewhat the sharp difference in size distri-
bution between the district and the nation. At the
end of the period, however, small organizations
still accounted for a much smaller share of assets
in the United States than the district. 
While the asset share of small organizations fell
in all district states, the magnitude of the decline
varied greatly among states (Table A2 in the
appendix). The two states that started the period
with the highest percentage of assets in small
organizationsKansas and Nebraskaalso expe-
rienced the biggest declines in that percentage.
The state with the least change in size distribution
was Oklahoma, where the failure of several large
energy banks during the 1980s limited the
increase in the share of large organizations to
only a few percentage points. The only state in
which the share of large organizations did not
rise at all was Colorado. Large organizations in
Colorado started out much more important than
in the rest of the district but suffered a loss in
asset share to medium-size organizations, causing
the state to resemble the district more closely by
the end of the period.
The decline in the role of small banking organi-
zations affected bank customers in all areas of the
district  but had an especially large impact on
rural customers. Chart 2 shows the shares of
rural and urban deposits held in offices of small
banking organizations.
10 From mid-1979 to mid-
1995, this deposit share fell 20 percentage points
in rural areas but only six percentage points in
urban areas. The reason the deposit share fell
more in rural areas was not that small rural
Table 4





Small 31 20 -11
Medium 28 26 -2
Large  41  54 13
100 100 0
United States 
Small 11 6 -5
Medium 16 13 -3
Large   73  81  8
100 100 0
Note: Small organizations are those with less than $100 million in assets in 1995 dollars; medium-size organizations are
those with $100 million to $1 billion; and large organizations are those with more than $1 billion. Organizations are de-
fined at the state level in all cases.
Source: Reports of Income and Condition and National Information Center Database.
34 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYbanking organizations disappeared at a greater
rate than small urban banking organizationson
the contrary, the number of small organizations
fell about the same percentage in both areas.
Rather, the reason was that rural areas started out
the period much more dependent on small or-
ganizations for banking services. Thus, as small
banking organizations disappeared, a relatively
high proportion of rural bank customers were
forced to shift their business to larger organiza-
tions, many of them based in urban areas. 
Did mergers cause the decline in the role of
small banks?
The fact that the share of small organizations
in district banking assets declined during a period
when  mergers  were high does not prove that
mergers caused the decline. Mergers would have
led to such a decline if large or medium-size
organizations had acquired small organizations.
On the other hand, if mergers had been confined
to large and medium-size organizations or to very
small organizations, the percent of assets in the
smallest size category would have been unaf-
fected. Moreover, the share of small organizations
in total assets could have declined for other
reasons besides mergersfor example, because
large organizations had outcompeted small organi-
zations for funds or because small organizations
were located primarily in slower growing areas.
The evidence shows that many small banking
organizations in the district were acquired by








Note: Data are for middle of year.
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ECONOMIC REVIEW · SECOND QUARTER 1996 35larger organizations over the course of the
period, implying that at least some of the shift
in size distribution was due to mergers. Over the
entire 16-year period, 840 small organizations
($25  billion in assets) were acquired in voluntary
mergers. Of these small organizations, about half
($8.5 billion in assets) were acquired by other
small organizations, with little effect on the size
distribution of assets.
11 But the other half ($16.5
billion in assets) were absorbed by large and
medium-size  organizations, directly reducing the
percent of total assets in the smallest size cate-
gory. Such acquisitions were especially high in
1993 and 1994, exceeding $2 billion both years.
Mergers clearly helped reduce the role of small
banking organization, but did they account for
all of the decline? To answer this question, the
direct effect of all voluntary mergers and break-
ups on the asset shares of the three size categories
was calculated for each quarter. These estimates
of the quarterly merger effect were then summed
over the entire period to obtain an estimate of
the total merger effect.
12 According to this calcu-
lation, mergers reduced the asset share of small
organizations by a total of 11 percentage points,
the same as the actual decline. Thus, the decline
in the role of small banking organizations was
due entirely to mergers and not to any tendency





Another possible consequence of banking
consolidation is an increase in the geographic
scope of bank operations. Mergers among bank-
ing organizations in different markets of the
same state should result in more organizations
with statewide operations, while mergers among
organizations in different states should result in
more organizations with nationwide or regional
operations. Some analysts argue that the growth
of banking organizations with widely dispersed
operations is undesirable because such banks are
inattentive to the needs of local communities and
inefficient at lending to small borrowers. Others
argue that the growth of such organizations is
desirable because they are more diversified and
thus less vulnerable to local downturns, and
because they can better serve the needs of large
nationwide businesses.
14 
This section shows that consolidation has signifi-
cantly increased the geographic scope of district
bank operations, both within and across states.
Out-of-market mergers have steadily increased the
share of local deposits controlled by organizations
based elsewhere in the state, especially in rural
areas. And after a slow start, interstate mergers
have increased the share of deposits controlled
by organizations based outside the state. This
increase in geographic scope may well be the
biggest effect of district banking consolidation,
although the data do not reveal whether the effect
has been harmful or beneficial to bank customers.
Intrastate expansion
 One measure of intrastate expansion is the
average penetration ratio in local banking mar-
ketsthe percent of deposits in each local market
held in branches or subsidiaries of organizations
based outside that market.
15 Chart 3 and Table 5
show that this ratio increased in both rural and
urban areas in the district but especially in rural
areas.  In rural areas, the penetration ratio
increased throughout the period, accelerating
somewhat after 1985. At the end of the period,
the ratio stood at 41 percent, an increase of 28
percentage points. The penetration ratio also
increased in urban areas. The increase was less
than half as much, however, and was concen-
trated in 1984 and 1985.
District banking organizations were not the
only ones to expand within state lines during the
36 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYperiod. Rural and urban penetration ratios rose
roughly the same amount in the United States as
the district and remained significantly higher
than in the district. Thus, despite the spread of
banking operations within district states, the
district continued to lag well behind the nation
in intrastate banking.
 Among district states, differences in intrastate
expansion are partly explained by differences in
legal restrictions (Table A3 in the Appendix).
The three states in which outside penetration of
local markets increased the most were Kansas,
Nebraska, and Oklahoma, all of which prohib-
ited multibank holding company expansion
at the start of the period but dropped the ban
later on. Local market penetration increased
almost as much in Missouri, even though that
state already permitted multibank holding com-
pany expansion.
Interstate expansion
Has consolidation resulted in more banking
organizations operating across state lines, as well
as over broader areas within states? Interstate
expansion can be measured by the proportion of
deposits in each state held in subsidiaries of
organizations headquartered outside the state
(Table 6). In the district as a whole, this propor-
tion remained low throughout the 1980s, increas-
ing only slightly from 4 percent at the beginning
of the decade to 6 percent at the end. The deposit
share of out-of-state organizations then increased
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ECONOMIC REVIEW · SECOND QUARTER 1996 37sharply in the 1990s, reaching 23 percent by the
end of 1995.
16 
Interstate banking got off to an earlier start in
the nation and ended up increasing even more
than in the district. The proportion of all deposits
in the United States held in out-of-state organiza-
tions surged from 3 percent to 20 percent in the
1980s. The share then continued climbing during
the 1990s, reaching 29 percent at the end of 1995.
While most district states experienced substan-
tial intrastate expansion during the period, the
degree of interstate expansion varied sharply
(Table A4 in the appendix). At one extreme were
the three mountain states of Colorado, New
Mexico, and Wyoming, where the deposit share
of out-of-state organizations increased well over
40 percentage points. In each of these states, more
than half of all deposits were controlled by
out-of-state organizations at the end of the
period, well above the national average. At the
other extreme were Missouri, where the out-of-
state deposit share failed to rise above 2 percent,
and Nebraska, where the deposit share reached
only 12 percent. These differences can be explained
partly by differences in  laws governing out-of-
state entry. By the end of the period, Colorado,
New Mexico, and Wyoming all permitted entry
by bank holding companies from anywhere in
the nation, while Missouri allowed entry only
from neighboring states.  Such legal differences
cannot explain all the variation in interstate
banking within the district, however, suggesting
that on economic grounds some district states
were more attractive to out-of-state banks than
others.
17
In contrast to intrastate expansion, which has
had a bigger impact on rural markets than urban
markets, interstate banking has mainly affected
urban markets. In mid-1979, 4 percent of rural
deposits and 5 percent of urban deposits in the
district were held in subsidiaries of out-of-state
banking organizations. By mid-1995, the percent
of rural deposits in out-of-state organizations had
Table 5
PERCENT OF LOCAL DEPOSITS IN BRANCHES OR SUBSIDIARIES 




R u r a l 1 34 12 8
Urban 11 22 11
United States
R u r a l 2 75 22 5
Urban 19 33 14
Note: Local markets are defined as MSAs or rural counties.  An outside organization is one whose main deposit 
market in the state is a different market.
Source: Summary of Deposits and National Information Center Database.
38 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYincreased to 13 percent, while the percent of
urban deposits in out-of-state organizations had
jumped to 29 percent.   
CONSOLIDATIONS IMPACT ON
LOCAL MARKET CONCENTRATION 
The third possible consequence of consolida-
tion is an increase in the concentration of local
banking markets. Markets are said to be concen-
trated if they are dominated by a few organiza-
tions that hold most of the deposits or make
most of the loans. To the extent consolidation
occurs through mergers among organizations
operating in the same market, concentration
should increase. Some analysts argue that such
an increase in concentration is undesirable
because it reduces competition among banking
organizations, leading to lower deposit rates,
higher loan rates, and lower quality services.
Others argue that increases in local market con-
centration do not have these adverse effects
because the threat of entry by outside organiza-
tions keeps organizations with high market
shares from trying to exploit their customers.
Some analysts even argue that in-market mergers,
which increase local concentration, may benefit
bank customers by reducing wasteful overlap
among banking organizations and enabling
organizations to cut their expenses.
18
This section shows that consolidation has
boosted the concentration of district banking
markets, especially urban markets. The increase
in concentration, however, appears to be less
dramatic than the decrease in the role of small
banks or the increase in geographic scope. And
the overall level of concentration remains moder-
ate, due partly to strong growth by those smaller
banking organizations that remained inde-
pendent.  In the case of urban markets, however,
the increase in concentration is also fairly recent.
If current trends continued, concentration could
become a greater concern.
Changes in local market concentration 
The most common measure of local market
concentration used by bank regulators is the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). For each
market, this index measures the tendency for
deposits to be concentrated in a few banking
organizations.
19 The HHI can range from close
to zero to as high as 10,000, with higher values
representing higher degrees of concentration.  For
example, a market with ten equal-size organizations
Table 6






Tenth District states 4 6 23 19
United States  3 20 29 26
Source: Reports of Income and Condition and National Information Center Database.
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equal-size organizations would have an index of
5,000; and a market with only one organization
would have an index of 10,000. In estimating
local market concentration, regulators also adjust
the index to take into account that thrift institu-
tions compete for at least some of the same
business as banks.
20 
Although there are exceptions, regulators gen-
erally worry about the anticompetitive effects of
a merger if it would raise the HHI by more than
200 points and also result in an index above
1,800. In keeping with this standard, most bank-
ing analysts consider a market to be unconcen-
trated if it has an HHI below 1,000, moderately
concentrated if it has an HHI between 1,000 and
1,800, and highly concentrated if it has an index
above 1,800. Rural markets usually have an HHI
well above 1,800 because they are defined to
include only one county and thus have a much
smaller number of organizations.
Chart 4 and Table 7 show that since 1979
concentration has increased in both rural and
urban markets in the district but especially in
urban markets. From mid-1979 to mid-1995, the
average HHI increased 186 points in rural mar-
kets and 449 points in urban markets.  The index
for urban markets ended up at 1,202, above the
cutoff for unconcentrated markets but near the
bottom of the range for moderately concentrated
markets. The timing as well as the magnitude of
the increase differed between the two types of










Note: Data are for middle of year, and thrift deposits have a 50 percent weight.

















40 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYmarkets. In rural markets, the index edged down
during the early 1980s, turned up in 1986, and
then leveled off in the 1990s. In urban markets,
by contrast, the HHI did not turn up until 1989
and then continued rising through the end of the
period, with an especially large jump in 1993.
Concentration also increased in rural and
urban markets nationwide, but to a smaller
degree than in the district. The average HHI rose
91 points in rural markets and 218 points in
urban markets.  Despite the smaller increase,
urban concentration remained slightly higher in
the United States than the district. Rural concen-
tration, on the other hand, ended the period
slightly lower in the United States than the
district.
Local market concentration increased more in
some district states than others (Table A5 in the
appendix). The urban HHI rose more than 300
points in all states except Oklahoma, where the
index increased only slightly. The change in rural
concentration varied more, with the HHI increas-
ing more than 200 points in Kansas, Nebraska,
and Oklahoma but falling modestly in Colorado
and Wyoming.
Did mergers cause the increase in local market
concentration?
As with the shift in size distribution, the fact
that concentration increased at a time when bank
mergers were high does not necessarily mean that
the mergers caused the increase. Local market
concentration may have increased only because
the dominant organizations in each market
outbid their smaller competitors for funds and
grew faster. Alternatively, concentration may have
increased due to the wave of thrift failures  in the
late 1980s and early 1990s. Anytime the deposits
of a failed thrift disappeared, the HHI tended to
increase because thrift institutions are included
in the calculation of the index. And anytime the
deposits of a failed thrift were taken over by a
large banking organization in the same market,
Table 7





Rural 2,608 2,794 186
Urban 753 1,202 449
United States
Rural 2,634 2,725 91
Urban 1,040 1,258 218
Note: The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is the sum of squared deposit market shares, with a 50 percent weight for thrift
deposits. Local markets are defined as MSAs or rural counties.
Source: Summary of Deposits, Survey of Savings, and National Information Center Database.
ECONOMIC REVIEW · SECOND QUARTER 1996 41the HHI tended to increase because the distribu-
tion of bank deposits became more unequal.
21
The geographic pattern of district mergers sug-
gests that mergers account for at least some of the
increase in local market concentration. Over the
period as a whole, about 280 urban organizations
with assets of $45 billion were acquired by organi-
zations with operations in the same market.
Furthermore, the year with the largest number of
such in-market mergers was 1993, when the urban
HHI showed an especially large jump. Not sur-
prisingly, a much smaller proportion of rural
acquisitions were by organizations operating in
the same market.  Still, almost 170 rural organi-
zations with $5 billion in assets were acquired in
this way, helping explain the fact that the rural
HHI increased as well. 
To determine precisely how much mergers
contributed to the increase in local market con-
centration, the direct effect of all voluntary merg-
ers and breakups on the HHI of each local market
was calculated for each year-long period between
successive Junes.
22 These estimates of the annual
merger effect were then summed over the entire
16-year period to obtain an estimate of the total
merger effect. According to this calculation, merg-
ers increased the urban HHI by a total of 347
points, more than three-fourths of the actual
increase in the index over the period. And merg-
ers increased the rural HHI by a total of 187
points, virtually the same as the actual increase
in the index.
While mergers had a clear tendency to raise
local market concentration, the fact that they
explain most of the increase in concentration
over the period does not mean that other factors
were unimportant. In the early 1990s, the closing
of large thrifts boosted urban concentration sig-
nificantly,  causing the actual increase in the
urban HHI to exceed the merger effect by a wide
margin during those years. Throughout the period,
however, the dominant banks in urban markets
tended to lose ground to their competitors when
not making acquisitions. In other words, adjusted
for mergers, deposits tended to grow slower at
dominant banks than at smaller banks. As a
result, the actual increase in the urban HHI fell
short of the merger effect during the 1980s. Thus,
while thrift closings and differential rates of
growth both had important effects on local mar-




The banking industry in Tenth District states
has undergone substantial consolidation over the
last 16 years.  Mergers were common in the first
half of the 1980s, and then trended noticeably
upward thereafter, reaching an especially high
level in the 1990s before subsiding somewhat in
1995.  By the end of 1995, mergers had reduced
the number of district banking organizations by
more than a third, about the same decline as in
the nation. While this activity has sparked much
debate about the pros and cons of banking
consolidation, evidence up to now has been
lacking on the actual effects of consolidation in
Tenth District states.
This article shows that consolidation has had
three main effects on the structure of district bank-
ing. First, as small organizations have been
absorbed, consolidation has caused a significant
decline in the percent of assets in small organiza-
tions and a matching increase in the percent of
assets in large organizations, with the medium-
size category largely unaffected. Second, through
the merger of organizations in different markets,
consolidation has produced a significant increase
in the geographic scope of banking, with banks
operating over much wider areas within and
across state lines. Third, through the merger of
organizations in the same market, consolidation
has resulted in some increase in the concentration
42 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYof local markets, although most urban markets
remain only moderately concentrated and domi-
nant banks appear to have lost ground to their
competitors when not making acquisitions.
Most of these changes in banking structure
have also occurred in the nation. But the changes
have generally been bigger in the district, reduc-
ing the wide disparity that used to exist between
banking structure in the district and the nation.
Despite this convergence, the district as a whole
still differs in important ways from the nation,
having a much higher proportion of small banks
and a lower degree of geographic diversification.
While the effects of consolidation have been
felt throughout the district, they have been more
pronounced in some states. The two states that
started out with the highest share of assets in
small organizationsKansas and Nebraskawere
also the states in which that share declined the
most. And the three states that first banned and
then permitted multibank holding company
expansionKansas, Nebraska, and Oklahoma
also experienced the greatest increase in statewide
banking. In contrast, interstate banking increased
much more in the mountain states of Colorado,
New Mexico, and Wyoming than in the rest of
the district, partly because these states allowed
entry from anywhere in the nation and partly
because they were viewed as attractive markets. 
Finally, the effects of consolidation have not
only differed across district states but also
between urban and rural areas within each state.
Due to their traditional dependence on small
banks, rural customers have been much more
affected than urban customers by the declining
role of small banks. And because so many rural
banks have been the target of out-of-market
acquisitions, rural customers have witnessed a
bigger shift in control of local banking resources
to organizations based elsewhere in the state. On
the other hand, urban bank customers have been
more affected by the growth of interstate banking
and the rise in local concentration, because most
out-of-state acquisitions have been of urban banks
and most in-market mergers have been between
urban banks. 
In short, consolidation has significantly altered
the structure of district banking. Nationwide,
most banking experts expect the decline in bank-
ing organizations to continue. How much addi-
tional consolidation will occur is difficult to
predict. But the fact that the district banking
structure has converged only partially toward the
national banking structure suggests that some
effects of consolidationsuch as the reduction in
the role of small bankswill continue to be felt
with greater force in the district.
ECONOMIC REVIEW · SECOND QUARTER 1996 43APPENDIX
Table A1
SOURCES OF CHANGE IN NUMBER OF BANKING ORGANIZATIONS
1980-84 1985-89 1990-95 Entire period
Colorado
Mergers and breakups -30 -13 -70 -113
Failures -3 -40 -13 -56
New charters 66 14 11 91
Conversions 11 20 5 36
Net change 44 -19 -67 -42
Kansas
Mergers and breakups -1 -78 -131 -210
Failures -2 -44 -6 -52
New charters 16 9 5 30
C o n v e r s i o n s 0022
Net change 13 -113 -130 -230
Missouri
Mergers and breakups -85 -54 -61 -200
Failures -4 -17 -4 -25
New charters 15 21 4 40
C o n v e r s i o n s 0011
Net change -74 -50 -60 -184
Nebraska
Mergers and breakups -20 -73 -76 -169
Failures -5 -27 -1 -33
New charters 11 5 5 21
Conversions 11 0 0 11
Net change -3 -95 -72 -170
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SOURCES OF CHANGE IN NUMBER OF BANKING ORGANIZATIONS
1980-84 1985-89 1990-95 Entire period
New Mexico
Mergers and breakups -6 -1 -3 -10
Failures 0 -3 -5 -8
New charters 6 0 1 7
Conversions 0 0 1 1
Net change 0 -4 -6 -10
Oklahoma
Mergers and breakups -26 -36 -83 -145
Failures -5 -84 -12 -101
New charters 55 9 0 64
Conversions 0 0 0 0
Net change 24 -111 -95 -182
Wyoming
Mergers and breakups 13 2 11 -26
F a i l u r e s - 2- 1 0 0- 1 2
New charters 13 0 0 13
Conversions 0 0 0 0
Net change -2 -12 -11 -25
Note: Failures exclude failed organizations succeeded by new organizations, while new charters exclude new organiza-
tions that succeed failed organizations. Conversions represent the net effect of banks becoming insured, thrifts con-
verting to banks, and banks converting to thrifts.
Source: National Information Center Database.
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PERCENT OF TOTAL ASSETS IN EACH SIZE CATEGORY 
OF BANKING ORGANIZATION
End of year
1979 1995 Change  1979 1995 Change 
Colorado New Mexico
Small 20 13 -7 Small 20 9 -11
Medium 14 26 12 Medium 34 37 3
Large  66  61  -5 Large  46  54  8
100 100 0 100 100 0
Kansas Oklahoma
Small 53 34 -19 Small 34 30 -4
Medium 42 34 -8 Medium 36 34 -2
Large   5  32 27 Large  30  36  6
100 100 0 100 100 0
Missouri Wyoming
Small 20 13 -7 Small 31 16 -15
Medium 21 17 -4 Medium 53 31 -22
Large  59  70  11 Large  16  54 38
100 100 0 100 100 0
Nebraska
Small 51 29 -22
Medium 22 26 4
Large  27  45 18
100 100 0
Note: Small organizations are those with less than $100 million in assets in 1995 dollars; medium-size organizations are
those with $100 million to $1 billion; and large organizations are those with more than $1 billion. Organizations
are defined at the state level.
Source: Reports of Income and Condition and National Information Center Database.
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PERCENT OF LOCAL DEPOSITS IN BRANCHES OR SUBSIDIARIES 
OF OUTSIDE BANKING ORGANIZATIONS
Middle of year
1979 1995 Change 1979 1995 Change
Colorado New Mexico
Rural 30 47 17 Rural 41 47 6
Urban 21 22 1 Urban 7 10 3
Kansas Oklahoma
Rural 0 31 31 Rural 0 29 29
Urban 0 18 18 Urban 0 19 19
Missouri Wyoming
Rural 26 50 24 Rural 27 46 19
Urban 18 30 12 Urban 5 9 4
Nebraska
Rural 3 43 40
Urban 0 12 12
Note: Local markets are defined as MSAs or rural counties. An outside organization is one whose main deposit mar-
ket in the state is a different market.
Source: Summary of Deposits and National Information Center Database.
Table A4
PERCENT OF DEPOSITS IN SUBSIDIARIES OF OUT-OF-STATE BANKING
ORGANIZATIONS
End of year
1979 1989 1995 Total change
Colorado 13 18 59 46
Kansas 1 1 16 15
Missouri * 1 2 2
Nebraska 8 9 12 4
New Mexico 12 9 61 49
Oklahoma * 5 20 20
Wyoming 18 32 69 51
* Less than 0.5 percent.
Source: Reports of Income and Condition and National Information Center Database.
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1 For recent overviews of banking consolidation in other
regions and the nation as a whole, see Amel 1996; Furlong
and Zimmerman; Klemme; Ludwig; Rhoades 1996; and
Yellen.
2 The number of banks has also declined sharply, but most
analysts believe the change in banking organizations is a
better measure of consolidation than the change in banks.
Banks belonging to a multibank holding company are
subject to common ownership and control, despite having
separate charters. As a result, such banks are more likely to
behave like bank branches than independent banks.
3 Population increased 13 percent from 1979 to 1994, the
most recent year for which data are available.
4 Population grew almost 30 percent in Colorado and New
Mexico from 1979 to 1994. The states with the smallest
population growth were Nebraska and Wyoming, where
population increased 4 percent and 5 percent, respectively.
5 The CPI excluding food and energy is used to adjust for
inflation. Mergers are included in the year in which they are
consummated. Also, the larger organization in each merger
is treated as the acquiror, even though in a few cases the
Table A5
CONCENTRATION OF LOCAL BANKING MARKETS
Average Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
Middle of year
1979 1995 Change 1979 1995 Change
Colorado New Mexico
Rural 3,030 3,000 -30 Rural 3,055 3,217 162
Urban 829 1,174 345 Urban 1,621 2,030 409
Kansas Oklahoma
Rural 2,342 2,657 316 Rural 2,495 2,735 240
Urban 679 1,046 367 Urban 779 809 30
Missouri Wyoming
Rural 2,636 2,745 110 Rural 3,308 3,220 -88
Urban 454 946 491 Urban 2,279 5,485 3,206
Nebraska
Rural 2,462 2,683 221
Urban 1,109 1,578 468
Note: Local markets are defined as MSAs or rural counties. An outside organization is one whose main deposit market
in the state is a different market.
Source: Summary of Deposits and National Information Center Database.
48 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYsmaller organization was actually the survivor. In addition
to the mergers represented in Table 1, the chart includes two
types of mergers that did not reduce the number of district
banking organizationsthose in which the acquiror owned
no district banks and those in which only part of an
organization was acquired. Over the period as a whole, there
were 31 acquisitions of the first type ($10.5 billion in assets)
and 56 acquisitions of the second type ($7.6 billion in
assets).
6 The moderation in district merger activity in 1995 may
come as a surprise, given the increased publicity about large
bank mergers in the national financial press. However,
Chart 1 excludes two major mergers that were announced
in 1995 but not consummated until the first quarter of
1996the acquisition of FirsTier of Nebraska by First Bank
of Minnesota and the acquisition of Fourth Financial of
Kansas by Boatmens of Missouri. Furthermore, the decline
in total mergers last year was not unique to the
districtdespite an unprecedented number of megamergers,
total mergers also declined in the nation as a whole (Bank
Mergers and Acquisitions). The drop in district mergers in
1995 was in keeping with the year-to-year fluctuations shown
in Chart 1 and does not imply that the consolidation trend
has ended.
7 Possible motives for recent mergers are discussed in Berger,
Hunter, and Timme; Berger, Kashyap, and Scalise;
Laderman 1995b; McLaughlin; and Radecki. Information
on geographic barriers to expansion in each state can be
found in Amel 1993.
8 For further discussion of these effects of a change in the
size distribution of banks, see Berger, Hunter, and Timme;
Berger, Kashyap, and Scalise; Keeton; Nakamura; Peek and
Rosengren; and Wilmarth.
9 Organizations are defined at the state level in Table 4. For
example, an interstate company with two $750 million
banks in different district states is counted as two
medium-size organizations rather than one large
organization. If organizations were computed at the district
level, the share of large organizations would be three
percentage points higher at the end of 1995, the share of
medium-size organizations three points lower, and the share
of small organizations unchanged. 
10 Deposits are used to measure the relative importance of
small organizations in rural and urban areas because
deposits are the only item that banks report separately for
their rural and urban branches. All data on local deposits
in this article are from the Summary of Deposits filed by
banks at the end of every June. Current MSA definitions are
used for the entire period.
11 A merger between two small organizations would reduce
the share of assets in the smallest size category if it created
a new medium-size organizationfor example, if a $75
million organization acquired a $50 million organization,
producing a $125 million organization. Most mergers
between small organizations did not result in medium-size
organizations, however.
12 The simplest way to explain the calculation is by example.
At the beginning of 1985, total district banking assets were
$229 billion in 1995 dollars. Suppose that sometime during
the first quarter, an organization that started the quarter
with $2 billion in assets acquired another organization that
started with $750 million in assets. Such a merger would be
estimated to shift $750 million in assets from the
medium-size category to the large category, reducing the
share of assets in the medium-size category by 0.33
percentage points (100 x .750/229). The effects of all such
mergers and breakups were calculated, including those in
which only part of an organization was acquired. 
13 The calculation also shows that mergers and breakups
reduced the asset share of medium-size organizations by a
total of five percentage points, three points more than the
actual decline. The reason was that large organizations
acquired an even greater amount of assets from medium-size
organizations than medium-size organizations acquired from
small organizations. Because ten large organizations were
acquired by other large organizations during the period,
mergers also contributed to a significant increase in the
average size of large organizations, from $2.9 billion at the
start of the period (1995 dollars) to $3.7 billion at the end.
14 For further discussion of these effects of an increase in
geographic scope, see Berger, Kashyap, and Scalise; Calem;
General Accounting Office; Keeton; Levonian; Nakamura;
and Wilmarth.
15 For each market, an outside organization is defined as
one whose main deposit market in the state is a different
MSA or rural county. Thus, for purposes of this calculation,
an out-of-state organization that did not operate in any
other markets in the state would not be considered an
outside organization.
16 The data for 1995 do not reflect two large out-of-state
acquisitions that were announced in 1995 but not
consummated until the first quarter of 1996 (see note 6).
These acquisitions increased the out-of-state deposit share
15 percentage points in Kansas and 13 points in Nebraska,
boosting the average deposit share for the district by three
percentage points.
17 For example, Oklahoma and Nebraska allowed entry
ECONOMIC REVIEW · SECOND QUARTER 1996 49from anywhere in the nation but had a much lower
out-of-state presence than the three mountain states. And
Kansas restricted entry to neighboring states but had a much
higher out-of-state presence than Missouri. 
18 For further discussion of these effects of an increase in
local market concentration, see Berger, Hunter, and Timme;
Hannan and Liang; Holdsworth; Radecki; and Shaffer. 
19 The HHI is the sum of the squared percentage market
shares of all organizations competing in the market. In the
special case in which all organizations are of the same size,
this sum equals 10,000 divided by the number of
organizations. More detailed explanations of the HHI can
be found in Laderman 1995a and Rhoades 1993.
20 Specifically, the HHI is calculated by assigning a weight
of 50 percent to all thrifts operating in the market. Under
this method, a market with one banking organization and
one thrift of the same size would have an HHI of 5,578 (672
 + 332)lower than a market with one banking organization
and no thrifts, but higher than a market with two equal-size
banking organizations and no thrifts.
21 The HHI for a particular market can also increase due to
deposit shifts within banking organizationsfor example,
because an interstate organization finds it convenient to
book deposits in a particular state. Between mid-1994 and
mid-1995, a large deposit influx of this kind raised the HHI
of Casper, Wyoming, over 4,000 points, tending to sharply
boost the urban HHI for the district.
22 The calculations were performed over these periods
because the Summary of Deposits data are reported only
once a year in June. As before, the simplest way to explain
the calculation is by example. At the end of June 1984, total
deposits in the Kansas City market were $13.7 billion
adjusted  for thrifts. Suppose that sometime during the next
12 months, two $1 billion banking organizations merged.
Such a merger would be estimated to replace two
organizations with 7.3 percent market shares (100 x 1/13.7)
by one organization with a 14.6 percent market share,
increasing the HHI by 107 points (14.62  - 2 x 7.32 ). The
effects of all such mergers and breakups were calculated,
including those in which only part of an organization was
acquired.
23 One indication that thrift closings had a major effect on
local concentration is that the HHI shows a much smaller
increase over the period when thrifts are excluded from the
calculation. With thrifts excluded, the rural HHI actually
declines 110 points instead of rising 186 points, and the
urban HHI increases 337 points instead of 449 points.
Under this method of calculation, the merger effect also
becomes much larger246 points for the rural HHI and 516
points for the urban HHI. Thus, mergers overexplain the
change in concentration when thrifts are excluded, confirming
that dominant banking organizations lost ground to smaller
banking organizations when not making acquisitions.
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